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Rehabilitating Lochner
BERNARD H. SIEGAN*
Section I of the fourteenth amendment incorporated the principles of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which specifically protected the contract and
property rights of native born citizens from discriminatory treatment by
the states. As this information suggests, the Thirty-ninth Congress, whichframed the amendment, was strongly dedicated to securing the material
rights. The Framers regarded due process as a general guarantee for natu-
ral and fundamental rights, which included liberty of contract and of pri-
vate ownership. At the time the amendment was framed and ratified, and
for some time thereafter, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court regarded
due process as safeguarding vested property interests but not contractualfreedom. By the time of the Lochner case, the Court, through the normal
course of adjudication, had erased this dubious distinction and secured
liberty of contract. This development was not antagonistic to the basic ra-
tionale of due process nor an unrealistic extension in meaning. It was con-
sistent with the Framers' meaning of due process.
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary constitutional jurisprudence has done much to re-
habilitate Lochner v. New York.1 In times past, this decision might
be comfortably dismissed on the ground that the judiciary should not
undertake the functions of a super-legislature. Today, this response
is not readily available to supporters of recent substantive due
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; J.D.,
1949, University of Chicago Law School. The author practiced law in Chicago until 1973
and was Research Fellow in Law and Economics at the University of Chicago Law
School in 1968-69.
This article will be part of a chapter in a forthcoming book by Prof. Siegan, tentatively
entitled THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTION.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Among the most controversial rulings of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, this 5-4 decision was delivered in the economic due process period of 1897-
1937, during which the Court struck down a considerable amount of economic
legislation.
I have previously examined the law and economics of the Lochner decision in my book,
B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 110-26 (1981).
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process and equal protection holdings, or to the practitioners of
noninterpretivism.2 However, the decision remains in difficulty with
the interpretivists, and in particular with what might be considered
the smoking-gun school of constitutional construction, which de-
mands strict proof about Framers' meaning and intention. In re-
sponse to such concerns, this article examines the relevant back-
ground and debates on the framing of the fourteenth amendment.
The evidence is very persuasive that Lochner was a legitimate inter-
pretation of original meaning. Full rehabilitation may be in order.
As the reader will recall, the case concerned freedom of contract:
whether a New York statute limiting working hours in bakeries and
confectionaries to ten per day and sixty per week violated the con-
tractual freedom secured by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled (5-4) that there was not
sufficient justification for the legislation to be upheld. The Court had
previously sustained a Utah law limiting employment in under-
ground mines and smelters to eight hours per day, except in cases of
emergency.3 However, because the New York law covered a situa-
tion considered far less perilous by the majority, and because it al-
lowed no exceptions, it was distinguishable from the Utah statute.
Laws reducing working hours were not necessarily beneficial since
they would also reduce wages, limiting the ability of the laborer to
support himself and his family. As one of the dissenting Justices
noted, the Court would have come to an opposite conclusion had the
law limited employment to eighteen hours a day, for working a
longer period would indeed be detrimental to health.4
In my view, such inquiry is an appropriate function for the Court
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which I
regard as a limitation on the powers of state government to deprive
people of their liberties. However, for many others, this analysis is
not acceptable unless the Framers of the clause can be deemed to
have contemplated it. These critics usually deny that the Framers'
conception of due process could include a state law limiting work
hours. This is the issue with which this paper is concerned.'
This inquiry will concentrate on the framing of section 1 of the
2. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159; Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases:
A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278 (1981).
3. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
4. 198 U.S. at 71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. In construing the Constitution, the aim should be "to discover the meaning, to
ascertain and give effect to the intent, of its framers and the people who adopted it. ...
As nearly as possible we should place ourselves in the condition of those who framed and
adopted it." Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934) (Suther-
land, J., dissenting).
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fourteenth amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 from
which its interpretation cannot be separated. The amendment was
framed by the Thirty-ninth Congress in 1866 and ratified by three-
fourths of the states by 1868. Although the Framers may have con-
sidered other sections more important, only sections 1 and 5 have
been judicially significant, and they read as follows:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
While opinion is divergent as to the full meaning of section 1,
commentators agree that at the least, it was intended to authorize
passage of and to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866; that
is, to make certain its provisions were permitted by the Constitution,
and to place its safeguards beyond the power of any subsequent Con-
gress to repeal. The chief purpose of this Act was to provide federal
protection for the emancipated Blacks in the exercise of certain de-
scribed liberties. However, it applied to all the states and benefitted
other people as well. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act are pertinent to this
examination and provide as follows:
Section 1. That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign Power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citi-
zens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, with-
out regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Section 2. That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant
of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or pro-
tected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account
of such person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is
prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in
the discretion of the court.6
Section 3 gave lower federal courts jurisdiction under the statute,
and the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. It provided for re-
moval to the federal courts of suits or prosecutions under the Act
commenced in state courts. Section 4 directed district attorneys,
marshals, and other federal officials to institute proceedings against
violators. The balance of the statute contained other provisions relat-
ing to enforcement.
In the Senate, the Civil Rights Bill was introduced on January 29,
1866 by its author, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, chairman of
the Judiciary Committee, and on March 1 in the House, by Repre-
sentative James F. Wilson of Iowa, chairman of its Judiciary Com-
mittee. Both were Republicans, members of the party that held sub-
stantial majorities in the two Houses. There were 42 Republicans
and 10 Democrats in the Senate, and 145 Republicans and 46 Dem-
ocrats in the House. At that time the eleven states that participated
in the late rebellion were not represented. The Republicans over-
whelmingly supported the Civil Rights Act initially when it was
voted on, as well as after President Johnson's veto. The Democrats
opposed it.
Determining legislative intention can at times be a very arduous
undertaking. How does a court decide what motivated 128 Repre-
sentatives and 33 Senators to vote for the joint resolution proposing
the fourteenth amendment? Only a small fraction spoke in the de-
bates. Moreover, speakers concerned with particular aspects empha-
sized them and ignored others. However, legislatures function to pro-
duce laws that generally reflect the members' will. Not every
legislator is expected to be fully knowledgable on every measure or
every issue. Legislatures operate primarily through committees
which are supposed to study and understand their assigned areas.
Individual members consequently defer considerably to committees
and their members. For some lawmakers, a vote may for the most
part represent an expression of confidence in a committee or mem-
bers of it that author or sponsor a measure. They may go along with-
out fully considering or comprehending some parts of a bill if they
are satisfied the authors generally mirror their prevailing concerns.
Committee majorities may also reflect the party line, which can be
decisive for certain lawmakers. It can also be assumed that
lawmakers are aware that explanations of committee chairmen or
other specially interested members will be important factors to be
considered by courts interpreting legislation. For these reasons, this
paper will be most concerned with the explanations and positions of
6. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
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floor managers and other leading proponents of the measures under
study.
Section 1 of Trumbull's bill was much amended before final pas-
sage of the legislation. It emerged less racially oriented than when
first introduced. The following is Trumbull's original section 1, show-
ing the subsequent changes:
Section 1. That all persons [of African descent] born in the United States
and not subject to any foreign Power, excluding Indians not taxed, are
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States, [and there shall be no
discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any
State or Territory of the United States on account of race, color or previous
condition of slavery; but the inhabitants] and such citizens of every race
and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall have the same right in every State and Territory
,to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to in-
herit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and
to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.'
Trumbull found authority for his bill in section 2 of the thirteenth
amendment, giving Congress power to enforce "by appropriate legis-
lation" section 1 which abolished slavery. The bill would make the
amendment meaningful by securing practical freedom for the former
slaves. "[O]f what avail will it now be that the Constitution of the
United States has declared that slavery shall not exist, if in the late
slaveholding States laws are to be enacted and enforced depriving
persons of African descent of privileges which are essential to
freemen?" By conferring citizenship, the bill entitled the former
slaves to exercise those rights guaranteed to citizens by the Constitu-
tion. A statute depriving a citizen of civil rights secured to other
citizens constitutes "a badge of servitude which, by the Constitution,
is prohibited."
To determine what those rights were, Trumbull referred to judi-
cial decisions defining article IV, section 2 (commonly referred to as
the comity clause), which declares that "[t]he citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States." He concluded that the opinion most elaborate upon
this clause and containing the settled judicial opinion (except
7. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). Deletions are within
brackets and additions are in italics.
8. Id.
9. Id.
possibly for being excessive on rights of suffrage), was that of Su-
preme Court Justice Bushrod Washington, delivered in Corfield v.
Coryell, an 1823 Federal Circuit Court case.10 Cited at various
times in the debates on the Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth
amendment, Washington's famous pronouncement on the meaning
of the privileges and immunities clause of article IV follows:
We feel no hesitation in confining [the constitutional provision] to these
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at
all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sover-
eign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more te-
dious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended
under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoy-
ment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject never-
theless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the
state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an
exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citi-
zens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and
immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general descrip-
tion of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the
elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution
of the state in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which
might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and
the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each state, in every other state,
was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the
corresponding provision in the old articles of confederation) "the better to
secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people
of the different states of the Union." But we cannot accede to the proposi-
tion . . . that, under this provision of the constitution, the citizens of the
several states are permitted to participate in all the rights which belong
exclusively to the citizens of any other particular state .... 11
The Illinois Senator observed that Washington's definition included
all of the rights set forth in the proposed legislation. The bill did no
more than protect the "fundamental rights belonging to every man
as a free man and which under the Constitution as it now exists we
have a right to protect every man in.'12 Actually, Washington's
opinion concerned citizens of one state engaged in activities in an-
other; Trumbull's position was that their rights should be no less in
their own states than outside of them.
Representative Wilson offered similar interpretations.13 He like-
wise asserted that the law created no new rights, but would enforce
the fundamental rights to which citizens were already entitled under
10. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
11. Id. at 551-52.
12. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 476 (1866).
13. Id. at 1117-19.
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the Constitution, quoting also from Justice Washington's construc-
tion of the article IV privileges and immunities clause.14 The Con-
gressman emphasized the basic character of the protections in the
bill and identified them as natural rights.' 5
In addition to arguing as Trumbull did, that the Act was author-
ized under the thirteenth amendment, Wilson also contended that
Congress had implied powers under the Constitution to enforce fun-
damental liberties of United States citizens from abridgment by the
states. It was necessary to establish such authority inasmuch as the
Act affected all the states and might apply to others than those
whom Congress could protect under the authority of the amend-
ment.16 According to the Congressman, the "great fundamental civil
rights which it is the true office of government to protect" were
named in the celebrated commentaries of England's Sir William
Blackstone and New York's Chancellor James Kent. Both declared
that the three absolute rights of individuals were those of personal
security, personal liberty, and personal property. All of the liberties
set forth specifically or generally in the proposed Civil Rights Act,
Wilson concluded, either were embodied in these rights or were nec-
essary for their enjoyment."
Continuing this theme later in the debates, Wilson asserted the
due process clause of the fifth amendment guaranteed the rights con-
tained in the bill and Congress had implied authority to set aside
state laws abridging exercise of them.
[A]n amendment to the Constitution [provides] that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." . . .
[TIhese are the rights to which this bill relates, having nothing to do with
subjects submitted to the control of the several States ....
The citizen is entitled to the right of life, liberty, and property. Now, if a
State intervenes and deprives him, without due process of law, of these
rights, as has been the case in a multitude of instances in the past, have we
no power to make him secure in his priceless possessions? When such a case
is presented can we not find a remedy? Who will doubt it?18
Opponents of the proposed legislation focused on the serious con-
stitutional problems it raised. First, there was the questionable rela-
tionship between the purpose of the thirteenth amendment, which
was to eliminate slavery, and the goal of the bill, which was to
14. Id. at 1117-18.
15. Id. at 1117.
16. Id. at 1118.
17. Id. at 1118-19.
18. Id. at 1294.
eliminate discrimination. Second was the issue of how the proposed
law could apply to Blacks or Whites who were free and never af-
fected by the amendment. Third, the opposition contended that
under the Dred Scott decision,19 Congress did not have authority to
confer citizenship on the former slaves. Fourth, it was argued that
Congress could not require the states to observe provisions in the Bill
of Rights inasmuch as it was solely a limitation on th6 federal gov-
ernment. And fifth, opponents doubted Congress had power to penal-
ize persons who in good faith obeyed state laws. To survive chal-
lenge, it was evident the legislation required a firmer constitutional
foundation, which in time the fourteenth amendment provided.
In the congressional debates, specific economic rights were men-
tioned as belonging to the freedmen or as being denied to them in
the South. Senator Trumbull said that all men have the right to
make contracts, buy and sell, and to acquire and dispose of prop-
erty.20 Senator Howard of Michigan asserted that the freedman
must be able to earn and purchase property and to benefit by the
"fruits of his toil and his industry. '21 Representative Thayer of
Pennsylvania was concerned that the freedmen have the ability to
make contracts for their labor and be allowed to purchase a home
and have the liberty to enjoy the ordinary pursuits of civilized life.22
Representative Lawrence of Ohio stated that all citizens have the
right to make contracts to "secure the privilege and rewards of la-
bor."23 Representative Windom of Minnesota was also concerned
that all citizens have the right to make contracts for their labor, to
enforce the payment of their "wages and the means of holding and
enjoying the proceeds of their toil. '24
Trumbull and Windom gave examples of laws (known as the
Black Codes) abridging the rights of the freed Blacks, which the Act
would outlaw. Mississippi enacted a statute authorizing local officials
to prevent freedmen from carrying on independent businesses and
compelling them to work only as employees. It barred freedmen
from holding, leasing or renting real estate. Georgia and South Car-
olina prohibited any Negro from buying or leasing a home.2 5 Repre-
sentative Cook was alarmed by laws "that [a] man not supporting
himself by labor shall be deemed a vagrant, and that a vagrant shall
be sold." 26
19. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
20. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866).
21. Id. at 504.
22. Id. at 1151.
23. Id. at 1833.
24. Id. at 1159.
25. Id. at 1160, 1759.
26. Id. at 1124. It has been said that the extent of the oppression of Blacks was
exaggerated. H. FLACK THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 96 (1908);
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Such conditions persuaded Congress to limit certain legislative
powers of the rebellious states. But Congress went much further in
the Civil Rights Bill, imposing it on all states for the benefit also of
individuals other than the former slaves. However, the legislators
were not interested in stripping the states of all powers in the racial
area. A considerable amount of congressional debate centered about
the language that had originally been inserted in section 1, after the
provision on citizenship, and which remained in the measure adopted
by the Senate, stating that "there shall be no discrimination in civil
rights or immunities ... on account of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of slavery." Proponents of the proposed Act in both Houses in-
sisted that neither this provision nor any other part of it related to
political rights, social privileges, voting, officeholding, jury service, or
school integration. However, primarily because the foregoing lan-
guage was sufficiently extensive to risk some such interpretations, the
Judiciary Committee voted to eliminate it while the measure was
pending in the House. Representative Wilson thought that the dele-
tion did not materially change the bill, "but some gentlemen were
apprehensive that the words we propose to strike out might give war-
rant to a latitudarian construction not intended." 27 The Senate ac-
cepted this amendment.2 8 With this language omitted, the bill was
much more confined in application. The change also diminished its
racial orientation, giving it a broader libertarian character.
The congressional debates evidence the existence of dual goals for
the civil rights legislation: to secure an equality of rights for Blacks
as well as for other citizens. Senator Trumbull viewed the bill as
affecting state legislation generally, quoting in his introductory state-
ments from a note to Blackstone's Commentaries: "In this definition
of civil liberty it ought to be understood, or rather expressed, that
the restraints introduced by the law should be equal to all, or as
much so as the nature of things will admit."2 He subsequently de-
nied that the bill benefits black men exclusively.
[It] applies to white men as well as black men. It declares that all persons
in the United States shall be entitled to the same civil rights, the right to
the fruit of their own labor, the right to make contracts, the right to buy
and sell, and enjoy liberty and happiness .... [The only object] is to secure
equal rights to all the citizens of the country .... 1
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1,
13 (1955).
27. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366 (1866).
28. Id. at 1413.
29. Id. at 474.
30. Id. at 599.
Still Trumbull sought to minimize the actual impact.
[I]f the State of Kentucky makes no discrimination in civil rights between
its citizens, this bill has no operation whatever in the State of Kentucky.
Are all the rights of the people of Kentucky gone because they cannot dis-
criminate and punish one man for doing a thing that they do not punish
another for doing?"1
Trumbull expressed essentially the same views in his speech urg-
ing the Senate to override President Johnson's veto. Again he em-
phasized its racial objectives and acknowledged applicability to the
rest of the population. This passage indicates the statute would im-
pose a reasonableness standard on state legislation:
The bill neither confers nor abridges the rights of any one, but simply de-
clares that in civil rights there shall be an equality among all classes of
citizens, and that all alike shall be subject to the same punishment. Each
State, so that it does not abridge the great fundamental rights belonging,
under the Constitution, to all citizens, may grant or withhold such civil
rights as it pleases; all that is required is that, in this respect, its laws shall
be impartial.32
In his introductory statement, Wilson asserted, "the entire struc-
ture of this bill rests on the discrimination relative to civil rights and
immunities made by the States 'on account of race, color, or previous
condition of slavery.' 33 He thought the thirteenth amendment em-
powered Congress to protect such rights. However, he recognized
that the measure might have a broader application and proceeded, as
previously reported, to argue that Congress had authority to enforce
the rights of others as well. It was also necessary to enact the statute
"to protect our citizens, from the highest to the lowest, from the
whitest to the blackest, in the enjoyment of the great fundamental
rights which belong to all men."13 4
The Civil Rights Act was entitled "A bill to protect all persons in
the United States in their civil rights and to furnish means for their
vindication." Congressmen other than the floor managers interpreted
the bill in a manner corresponding to the first part of this title.
Representative John Bingham, Republican of Ohio (about whom a
great deal more will be said later), viewed the measure as impacting
the entire nation. It was not proposed
simply for the protection of freedmen in their rights for the time being in
the late insurrectionary States. That is a great mistake. It applies to every
31. Id. at 600.
32. Id. at 1760. That a reasonableness standard would apply in implementing the
statute is also evident in some remarks of Senator Henderson of Missouri. In responding
to assertions that by conferring citizenship on certain Indians, the states would lose
power to adopt regulations governing their activities, Henderson stated that the states
would still have power to determine among other things whether the person was compe-
tent to make contracts, as in the case of minors and lunatics. Id. at 572. See also Repre-
sentative Wilson's explanations to the same effect later in the text.
33. Id. at 1118.
34. Id.
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State in the Union, to States which have never been in insurrection, and is
to be enforced in every State of the Union, not only for the present but for
all future time, or until it shall be repealed by some subsequent act of Con-
gress. It does not expire by virtue of its own limitation; it is intended to be
permanent.3 5
In a lengthy speech urging the House to override the President's
veto, Representative Lawrence asserted the bill would have a very
broad impact. He claimed it would protect every citizen in the exer-
cise of fundamental liberties. "It is scarcely less to the people of this
country than Magna Charta was to the people of England."3 The
legislation required that "whatever of certain civil rights may be en-
joyed by any shall be shared by all citizens in each State, and in the
Territories. 37
Representative Broomall of Pennsylvania interpreted the proposed
legislation broadly. He asserted that "[i]ts terms embrace the late
rebels, and it gives them the rights, privileges, and immunities of
citizens of the United States."38 The bill would help "secure protec-
tion to the loyal men of the South," who were victims in their person
and property of oppression and prosecution in the Southern states
only because of their loyalty to the Union; "loyal men [who] ...
have had their property confiscated by the State courts, and are de-
nied remedy in the courts of the reconstructed South" would deserv-
edly be accorded federal protections.39
Representative Raymond of New York construed the act as "se-
curing an equality of rights to all citizens of the United States, and
of all persons within their jurisdiction."40 He favored the principles41
but voted against it because Congress lacked authority to enact it.4 2
Senator Davis of Kentucky (an opponent of the measure) contended
the bill broke down the legal system in all of the states, "so far not
only as the Negro, but as any man without regard to color is con-
cerned. 43 Representative Thayer (a supporter) asserted that the
"bill [extends] these fundamental immunities of citizenship to all
classes of people in the United States. 44 Senator Hendricks of Indi-
ana (an opponent) stated the bill provides "that the civil rights of all
35. Id. at 1292.
36. Id. at 1832.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1263.
39. Id. at 1265.
40. Id. at 2502.
41. Id. at 1267.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 598.
44. Id. at 1153.
men, without regard to color, shall be equal."'4 5 Congressman Kerr
of Indiana (an opponent) believed that under the measure "Congress
may, then, go into any State and break down any State constitutions
or laws which discriminate in any way against any class of persons
within or without the State." It would be able to "determine for each
state the civil status of every person, of any race or color, who
should elect to settle therein."4
Representative Shellabarger of Ohio (a supporter) noted the bill
was limited to protecting citizens from deprivations on account of
race or color. He used the term race synonomously with nationality.
Were the bill not passed, the states would be in a position to adopt
discriminatory measures against, for example, Germans: then "this
Government [would be] in this position of utter hopelessness. 47
Representative Hill of Indiana (a supporter) sought unsuccessfully to
amend the bill by excepting from its protection "those who have vol-
untarily borne arms against the Government of the United States or
given aid and comfort to the enemies thereof." Evidently, he thought
the bill protected these individuals. 48 Senator Cowan of Pennsylvania
(an opponent) contended the bill "confers ... upon everybody native
born in all the States, the right to make and enforce contracts, be-
cause there is no qualification in the bill, and the very object of the
bill is to override the qualifications that are upon those rights in the
States .... The power given to these people by this bill is unlimited
as to persons, and it is equally unlimited as to contracts. ' 49
Some speakers considered only the effect on emancipated persons
and did not comment on the meaning of the statute for the rest of
the population. On the other side of the question was Senator How-
ard of Michigan (a supporter) who insisted the bill was confined to
eliminating discrimination on the basis of race or color. 0 Opponents
Senator Guthrie of Kentucky and Representative Eldridge of Wis-
consin both indicated that this was also their understanding.5 Sena-
tor Stewart of Nevada (a supporter) asserted the bill did no more
than strike at the renewal of any attempt to return the freedmen to
slavery or peonage. Senator Henderson of Missouri (a supporter)
thought its sole object was to break down the system of oppression in
the seceded states.52
These narrow interpretations are difficult to reconcile with aboli-
tionist doctrine that emphasized legal equality generally and not just
45. Id. at 601.
46. Id. at 1268.
47. Id. at 1293-94.
48. Id. at 1154.
49. Id. at 1782.
50. Id. at 504.
51. Id. at 601, 1155.
52. Id. at 1785, 3034.
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with respect to race. The former abolitionists were very influential in
Republican ranks. Their ideal was that "slaves and free Negroes
. . must receive legal protection in their fundamental rights along
with all other human beings."5 They had long comprehended the
moral and practical problems of isolating their pleas for legal equal-
ity to one area. Because the result would be to limit the powers of
government, this perspective was highly acceptable in the generally
laissez-faire climate of the Republican Party. The explanations of
the bill by both Trumbull and Wilson reflected these important phil-
osophical concerns and appealed to the vast majority of their party
who shared them.
Nor are the narrow interpretations of the Act confirmed in the
language; its terms benefit persons other than black citizens. Refer-
ring to the citizenship provision in his veto message, President John-
son remarked that it also included and made citizens "the Chinese of
the Pacific States, Indians subject to taxation, the people called Gyp-
sies, as well as the entire race designated as blacks, people of color,
negroes, mulattoes, and persons of African blood."54 Trumbull did
not deny this in his response, dismissing the point as insignificant to
the major thrust of the law. 55 Johnson could have gone much further
in describing the inclusiveness of the measure. Most whites were also
"persons born in the United States" and, therefore, as "such citizens
of every race and color" entitled to "the same right in every State
and Territory ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." This last phrase
does not affect the composition of the benefitted group for it only
relates to the safeguards provided them. In the case of whites, it
would mean "as is enjoyed by [other] white citizens." Assuming
white citizens then generally enjoyed the protected liberties, a state
could not deny them without good cause to certain of those born in
the United States, either individuals or groups. 56
53. J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 118 (2nd printing 1969). See also H.J.
GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 168-71 (1968).
54. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1679 (1866).
55. Id. at 1757.
56. In 1860, the total resident population of the United States was 31,513,000 of
which 4,138,697 were foreign born. The figures for 1870 were 39,905,000 and 5,567,229,
respectively. THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES
TO THE PRESENT 8, 117-18 (1976). Given the small percentage of foreign-born persons,
implementation of the provisions of the Act would be little disturbed by the existence of
this group.
The Civil Rights Act can also be read as not qualifying the enumerated rights (con-
tracts, suit, etc.) with the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens." This language would
then apply only to the portion relating to "proceedings for the security of person and
property." However, my construction of the Act would not change under this
As originally drafted, the Senate bill contained only the qualifica-
tion "the same right;" the words "as is enjoyed by white citizens"
were added in the House Judiciary Committee on an amendment
offered by Chairman Wilson. His reasoning was that "unless these
qualifying words were incorporated in the bill, those rights might be
extended to all citizens, whether male or female, majors or minors.
So that the words are intended to operate as a limitation and not as
an extension . . . . , This meant that courts passing on claims of
women and minors would have to consider state common or statu-
tory law as to their entitlement to civil rights (which for women and
minors would depend on the rights involved, or for minors, the age of
maturity). Thus, the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" was a
standard by which to determine state compliance with the Act.
In the instance of native born whites, the words "shall have the
same rights ... as is enjoyed by white citizens" would likewise con-
stitute a standard by which state legislation would be judged. Thus
the Act would affect state economic regulation denying the protected
citizens, black and/or white, the right to make contracts freely for
various purposes, such as in relation to employment, business, or
property. For a statute to survive attack, a court would have to find
that the affected citizens were not treated unequally - in effect,
that the law was justified - as would later be required during the
Lochner period.
Returning again to its enactment, the Civil Rights Act easily
passed in the Congress. Thirteen Senators spoke on its merits, most
of whom did not find any; fourteen discussed it in the House, again
mostly in opposition. The bill passed in the Senate on February 22
by a vote of 33-12 and on March 13 in the House, 111-38. Thereaf-
ter, on April 6, the Senate voted to override President Johnson's veto
by a margin of 33-15, and the House did the same on April 9, by a
vote of 122-41.
The Thirty-ninth Congress also passed the Freedmen's Bureau
Bill, intended, among other things, to protect the rights of emanci-
pated slaves. Trumbull introduced it on the same day he presented
the Civil Rights Bill. President Johnson vetoed it and was sustained,
but Congress subsequently passed a modified version which survived
another veto. Each version protected against deprivation of the same
rights enumerated in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act, again evi-
interpretation, although others may consider it as strengthening the view that the Act
affected whites.
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), the United States
Supreme Court found that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 applied to the civil rights of
whites as well as non-whites. The case concerned alleged discrimination against whites.
57. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 157 (1866).
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dencing Congress' high priority for property and economic
freedoms.
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Bingham's Early Version of Section 1
Prior to the House debates on the Civil Rights Bill, the select
Joint Committee on Reconstruction voted to submit to Congress a
resolution proposing a fourteenth amendment to the Constitution,
which committee member Representative John Bingham of Ohio, its
primary author, presented to the House on February 26, 1866. It
was concurrently introduced in the Senate, but never considered by
that body. The Ohio legislator would later become the principal au-
thor of the major provision in the final version of the fourteenth
amendment; Justice Hugo Black dubbed him "the Madison of the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment."59 This earlier version of
what later became the second sentence in section 1, provided as
follows:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
The first part was worded to incorporate article IV, section 2,
while the second used terminology not elsewhere present although
indicative of the due process language of the fifth amendment. Ac-
cording to the Ohio Representative, the amendment would enable
Congress to apply fundamental rights contained in the Constitution
to the states which were then not affected by them. "Every word of
the proposed amendment is today in the Constitution, save the words
conferring the express grant of power upon the Congress of the
United States." The Framers had omitted inserting authority for
Congress to enforce against the states "the great canons of the su-
preme law." The amendment would, he said, arm Congress "with
the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution
today." It encompassed no more than what was protected under two
provisions of the Constitution, the privileges and immunities clause
of article IV and the due process clause of amendment V.10
58. Id. at 318, 209-10. The second Freedmen's Bureau Act was carried over veto
on July 16, 1866.
59. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
60. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1088-89 (1866).
Gentlemen admit the force of the provisions in the bill of rights, that the
citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States in the several States, and that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law .... 6 1
On this and at various times, Bingham used the term "Bill of
Rights" to include all liberties protected in the Constitution; this, as
he said on occasion, was the "immortal bill of rights," according it a
natural rights connotation, as other abolitionists were inclined to
do.62 At other times, to be sure, he confined the term to the first
eight amendments.
An opponent of the Civil Rights Act, the Congressman believed a
constitutional amendment was required before Congress could im-
pose civil rights restraints on the states. The House, however, was
not disposed toward the general structure of the proposed amend-
ment, but refused to table it, and after some debate, on February 28
by a vote of 110-37, postponed consideration until the second week
of April. Bingham voted with the majority. The measure was never
taken up again and was replaced by the final version.
The problem with this earlier version was that instead of prohibit-
ing state action infringing on liberties, the amendment placed the
obligation entirely on Congress, granting it what was considered ei-
ther excessive or ill-defined authority over the states, and enabling
future Congresses to change policy. The final version of section 1
was drafted to meet this concern. Consistent with the form of other
constitutional protections, it prohibited certain state actions, and its
provisions could be overcome only by another amendment, not the
will of another Congress. Consideration of the February proposal is
important because the scope of its protections is quite similar to that
of the final version, and it is therefore instructive as to the latter's
meaning.
From Bingham's perspective, the amendment would have made
the Civil Rights Act unnecessary. He rejected the statute in part
because it removed some inherent state powers and centralized them
in the federal government.63 His proposed amendment would greatly
advance freedom and yet maintain the federal-state balance. "[T]he
care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen ... is in
the States, and not in the Federal Government. I have sought to ef-
fect no change in that respect in the Constitution of the country.16 4
Under the amendment, state authorities would only have to answer
nationally if "they enact laws refusing equal protection to life, lib-
61. Id. at 1089.
62. J. TENBROEX, supra note 53, at 128, 215.
63. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866).
64. Id.
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erty or property."6 15
The Ohio legislator explained that the equal protection provision
of the amendment applied the due process guarantee to the states.
He equated these two concepts; each comprehended the other. There
could be no liberty without equality and vice versa. On initial consid-
eration this might seem to be an untenable position, for there is fre-
quently thought to be irreconcilable tension between liberty and
equality. Governments impose many laws and regulations that
achieve the latter at the expense of the former. However, this is the
statist version of equality, to be brought about by adoption of laws
that make people alike in their condition and not the libertarian one
advanced by Bingham, espoused by John Locke among others, which
comes from the rejection or elimination of laws that treat people un-
equally. For him, equality before the law meant that all laws should
apply equally, and that no person or persons would be favored or
denied. When government limits liberties of certain individuals, it
also denies them equality with others not so incapacitated.66 Bing-
ham was far from alone in this thinking. For a great many years
prior to the Civil War, abolitionists had maintained that the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment required that the laws treat
equally all persons similarly situated with respect to life, liberty, and
property.67 Legislation treating certain people in a different or spe-
cial way without adequate cause - therefore unequally - was
found to be violative of due process in a number of judicial decisions
65. Id. at 1090.
66. Though. . . all men by nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to under-
stand all sorts of equality. Age or virtue may give men a just precedency. Excel-
lency of parts and merit may place others above the common level. Birth may
subject some, and alliance or benefits others, to pay an observance to those to
whom nature, gratitude or other respects may have made it due; and yet all this
consists with the equality which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or
dominion one over another, which was the equality. . . being that equal right
that every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will
or authority of any other man.
J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. VI, § 54.
The same perspective is set forth in considerable depth in F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF LIBERTY 85-102 (1960). According to Hayek, the "great aim of the struggle for
liberty has been equality before the law." Id. at 85. "Equality before the law and mate-
rial equality are therefore not only different but in conflict with each other; and we can
achieve either the one or the other, but not both at the same time." Id. at 87.
67. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 53, at 51-56. The idea was common to a great
many other Republicans of the period. See Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative His-
tory," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17
(1954).
prior to the Civil War. 8 Subsequent to ratification of the fourteenth
amendment, courts employed the due process, equal protection, or
both clauses to nullify legislation arbitrarily denying liberties to indi-
viduals or groups. To sustain a statute under either clause, a state
had to show that sufficient reason existed to account for the differen-
tial treatment.6 9
Commentators have referred to some of Bingham's positions as
"peculiar," but apparently they were not then so regarded. On the
floor of the House, his colleagues frequently acknowledged him to be
a competent constitutional lawyer. That Congressional leaders held
him in high esteem is also evident from his appointment to the very
influential Reconstruction Committee and the important role he ex-
ercised in it. He became chairman of the committee in the third ses-
sion of the Fortieth Congress. A prominent and influential Congress-
man in 1866, the Ohio Representative has been described variously
as radical, moderate, and conservative.7 0 He had roots in the anti-
slavery movement, but contrary to most of its Congressional activ-
ists, opposed the Civil Rights Bill as a whole as well as the portion of
the bill that forbade discrimination in civil rights and immunities
and that was eliminated prior to passage.
Bingham is a much admired figure, yet he does not lack for critics.
Contemporary commentators have little trouble finding fault. His
lengthy speeches are not always clear in meaning or thought. More-
over, his interpretations of some constitutional issues are at great va-
riance with modern thinking, making him even more difficult to com-
prehend. Like many of his Republican colleagues, he advanced
antislavery political theory and the constitutional interpretations that
accompanied it.
Bingham articulated his views on the issues with which the three
major guarantees of section 1 are concerned in two speeches
presented before Congress - one in 1857,71 the other in 1859.2 His
later addresses to the Thirty-ninth Congress reveal similarity in posi-
tion. Bingham customarily viewed privileges and immunities and due
process in natural rights terminology, each as insulating human free-
dom from government oppression. In his 1857 speech, he defended
the power of Congress to control slavery in the Territories, while in
1859 he attacked Oregon's attempt at statehood because it barred
68. See R.L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 256-79 (1926).
69. See id. at 275-99. The similarity of the two clauses is discussed by Chief
Justice Warren in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
70. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1049,
1052 (1956) (radical); M.L. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE (1976) (conserva-
tive); B.B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECON-
STRUCTION (1914) (moderate).
71. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 135 (1857).
72. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981 (1859).
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freed negroes and mulatoes from settling there or holding real prop-
erty and making contracts within it. Bingham expressed ideas that
later would be instrumental in framing the critical clauses of section
1.
Like Trumbull and Wilson, Bingham construed article IV, section
2 as guaranteeing fundamental rights: these were, he contended, nat-
ural or inherent liberties of citizens of the United States that were
intended to be secure from violation by the states. This position re-
quired an interpretation that essentially eliminated the section as the
comity clause between the states as it has traditionally been re-
garded; yet it was a construction that Bingham regarded as intended,
even self-evident. A strong believer in natural rights, he maintained
a distinction between them and political rights, relating the former
to safeguarding of life, liberty, and property. Natural rights were
insulated from the majority, whereas political rights were its prod-
uct. The following are excerpts from his two speeches relating to
privileges and immunities.
I deny that any State may exclude a law abiding citizen of the United
States from coming within its Territory, or abiding therein, or acquiring
and enjoying property therein, or from the enjoyment therein of the "privi-
leges and immunities" of a citizen of the United States .... [Pursuant to
article IV, section 2, the] citizens of each State, all the citizens of each
State, being citizens of the United States, shall be entitled to "all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States." Not to the rights and
immunities of the several States; not to those constitutional rights and im-
munities which result exclusively from State authority or State legislation;
but to "all privileges and immunities" of citizens of the United States in the
several States. There is an ellipsis in the language employed in the Consti-
tution, but its meaning is self-evident that it is "the privileges and immuni-
ties of the citizens of the United States in the several States" that it guar-
anties [sic].
. . .[C]itizens of the United States . . . are entitled to all of the privileges
and immunities . . . amongst which are the rights of life and liberty and
property, and their due protection in the enjoyment thereof by law .... 73
All free persons, then, born and domiciled in any State of the Union, are
citizens of the United States; and, although not equal in respect of political
rights, are equal in respect of natural rights. Allow me, sir, to disarm
prejudice and silence the demagogue cry of "negro suffrage," and "negro
political equality," by saying, that no sane man ever seriously proposed po-
litical equality to all, for the reason that it is impossible. Political rights are
conventional, not natural; limited, not universal; and are, in fact, exercised
only by the majority of the qualified electors of any State, and by the mi-
nority only nominally."'
His due process orientation was of the same character. According
73. Id. at 984.
74. Id. at 985.
to Bingham, the due process guarantee of the fifth amendment
secures natural rights of all persons, requires equal treatment by the
law, and comprehends the highest priority for ownership. Note his
statement that no one shall be deprived of property "against his con-
sent," a stronger affirmation of property rights than contemplated in
the fifth amendment, which contains no such qualification.
[Niatural or inherent rights, which belong to all men irrespective of all
conventional regulations, are by this constitution guarantied [sic] by the
broad and comprehensive word "person," as contradistinguished from the
limited term citizen - as in the fifth article of amendments, guarding those
sacred rights which are as universal and indestructible as the human race,
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property but by due
process of law, nor shall private property be taken without just
compensation. 17 5
Who... will be bold enough to deny that all persons are equally entitled to
the enjoyment of the rights of life and liberty and property; and that no one
should be deprived of life or liberty, but as punishment for crime; nor of his
property, against his consent and without due compensation?78
It must be apparent that the absolute equality of all, and the equal protec-
tion of each, are principles of our Constitution, which ought to be observed
and enforced in the organization and admission of new States. The Consti-
tution provides, as we have seen, that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. It makes no distinction
either on account of complexion or birth - it secures these rights to all
persons within its exclusive jurisdiction. This is equality. It protects not only
life and liberty, but also property, the product of labor. It contemplates that
no man shall be wrongfully deprived of the fruit of his toil any more than of
his life.7
The due process guarantee was no less important to him in 1866.
Delivered in oratorical style, the following passage from a speech
urging adoption of his early version of section 1 reveals Bingham's
commitment to a natural rights perspective holding due process to
embody the highest reaches of justice.
Your Constitution provides that no man, no matter what his color, no mat-
ter beneath what sky he may have been born, no matter in what disastrous
conflict or by what tyrannical hand his liberty may have been cloven down,
no matter how poor, no matter how friendless, no matter how ignorant,
shall be deprived of life or liberty or property without due process of law -
law in its highest sense, that law which is the perfection of human reason,
and which is impartial, equal, exact justice; that justice which requires that
every man shall have his right; that justice which is the highest duty of
nations as it is the imperishable attribute of the God of nations.7 8
Consistent with such beliefs, Bingham rejected any constitutional
distinction between citizens and persons in safeguarding liberties. In
the debates on the Civil Rights legislation, he opposed substituting
the word "citizen" for "inhabitant" because it confined protections. 9
75. Id. at 983.
76. Id. at 985.
77. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 140 (1857).
78. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1866).
79. Id. at 1292.
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Two other events are worthy of comment in considering Bing-
ham's beliefs. In his maiden speech to Congress in 1856, he charged
that a law passed by the Kansas Territorial Legislature, making it a
felony for any free person to assert that no one has the right to hold
slaves in the Territory, abridged "the freedom of speech and of the
press, and deprive[d] persons of liberty without due process of
law."80 He apparently considered due process as protective also of
activity not ordinarily associated with preservation of life, liberty
and property.
Bingham's concern for constitutionally guaranteeing property and
other interests not related to race discrimination is evident in a
change he sought in the draft of a proposed constitutional amend-
ment adopted by the Reconstruction Committee which was authored
by the famous Representative Thaddeus Stevens. This occurred after
the postponement by the House in the consideration of Bingham's
early version, as already described. Section 1 of Stevens' amendment
provided: "No discrimination shall be made by any State, nor by the
United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude." Bingham moved to add the fol-
lowing provision to it: "nor shall any State deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws, nor take private property
for public use without just compensation." This motion lost in the
Committee 5-7, with three absent. 1 Presumably Bingham desired to
extend the protections of the draft amendment beyond race relations
to other personal freedoms and additionally to safeguard property
from any form of confiscation.
It is most doubtful that he intended to augment the section's racial
protections. Stevens' section 1 was similar in language to the provi-
sion in the original Civil Rights Bill forbidding "discrimination in
civil rights and immunities" which the House, and subsequently the
Senate, deleted.82 Bingham had urged that action because "the term
civil rights includes every right that pertains to the citizen under the
Constitution, laws, and Government of this country."'8 3 One given to
such an understanding would hardly have thought more protection
was needed for such rights than was already provided in Stevens'
section 1. Nor does it seem Bingham would have received the sup-
port he did for his proposal from Representative Rogers and Senator
80. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 124 (1856).
81. B.B. KENDRICK, supra note 70, at 85.
82. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366, 1413 (1866).
83. Id. at 1291.
Johnson, both Democrats and opponents of the Civil Rights Act, had
they believed it was so directed.
The equal protection provision he proposed was in the same lan-
guage that Bingham drafted for this clause in the final version of
section 1. The preceding episode reveals that equal protection relates
to more than just race discrimination; it constitutes a substantive
limitation on other state actions. Stevens voted to support Bingham's
motion indicating his preference for coverage beyond race relations.
Subsequently, the committee deleted Stevens' section 1 and substi-
tuted for it what is now its second sentence which Bingham
authored.
While he emphasized the abolition of slavery and racial discrimi-
nation, Bingham emerges essentially as a man of strong libertarian
convictions, committed to preserving a wide array of individual free-
doms from molestation by government. His ideas are important not
only to understanding the authorship of section 1, but also in provid-
ing insight into the thinking of the political leaders who approved it.
The election of 1860 brought the Republicans, the party of the anti-
slavery movement, to national power. Prominent members of the
party, whether radical, moderate, or conservative, had strong anti-
slavery convictions and sought, after emancipation, to bring the for-
mer slaves into the mainstream of American society and economy.
As evident from the debates on the Civil Rights Bill, their political
and constitutional theories stressed equal protection of the laws,
which meant that no person was to be advantaged or disadvantaged
by the laws. According to William H. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of
State and a prominent Republican, the party stood above all for
"one idea ...the equality of all men before human tribunals and
human laws."'8 4 The abolitionists advanced natural law concepts that
libertarian thinkers had long projected in support of an economic
system dedicated to private property and free enterprise. Thus, their
ideas of equality supported the positions associated with Adam
Smith and John Locke.85 Frequently their proclamations in the
84. 4 W. SEWARD, WORKS 302 (G. Baker ed. 1884) quoted in Nelson, The Im-
pact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Cen-
tury America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 537 (1974). However, to acquire popular support,
the Republican 1860 platform did advocate a high protective tariff and free homesteads.
85. Among the rights to which the abolitionists gave prime attention were those
of property and contract. They urged that these liberties be extended to all people, for
these were natural rights that would enable the dependent poor to become financially
secure and thus, independent. Nelson, supra note 84, at 555-57.
On the economic views of the named men, see K.I. VAUGHN, JOHN LOCKE, ECONOMIST
AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST (1980); A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1937).
Blackstone explained the common law as supportive of these ideas of limited
government.
[Civil liberty] is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws
(and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
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advocacy days prior to the Civil War sounded like they emanated
from these sources. a6
Bingham's early version of section 1 would have enabled Congress
public. Hence we may collect that the law, which restrains a man from doing
mischief to his fellow citizens, though it diminishes the natural, increases the
civil liberty of mankind: but every wanton and causeless restraint of the will of
the subject, whether practiced by a monarch, a nobility, or a popular assembly,
is a degree of tyranny. Nay, that even laws themselves, whether made with or
without our consent, if they regulate and constrain our conduct in matters of
mere indifference, without any good end in view, and laws destructive of liberty
* .*. . [T]hat constitution or frame of government, that system of laws, is alone
calculated to maintain civil liberty, which leaves the subject entire master of his
own conduct, except in those points wherein the public good requires some di-
rection or restraint.
I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121-22.
86. J. TENBROEK, supra note 53, sets forth these examples:
The call for the Macedon anti-slavery convention of June 8-10, 1847 provided
1. The true foundation of Civil government is the equal, natural, and inaliena-
ble rights of all men - and the moral obligation resting on the entire commu-
nity to secure the free exercise of these rights, including life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness, to each individual, in his person and his property, and in
their management.
3. The sole and indispensable business of civil government is to secure and pre-
serve the natural and equal rights of all men, unimpaired, to prevent and re-
dress, violations of original rights. And the benefits of government are not pur-
chased by the giving up of any portion of our natural rights for protection of the
rest.
5. All monopolies, class legislations, and exclusive privileges are unequal, unjust,
morally wrong, and subversive of the ends of civil government.
6. The primary and essential rights of humanity are, the right to occupy a por-
tion of the earth's surface ....
9. The right of self-ownership includes, of necessity, the right of each individ-
ual to the direction and to the products of his own skill and industry, and the
disposal of those products, by barter or sale, in any portion of the earth where a
purchaser can be found. These original and natural rights, civil government may
neither infringe or impair and all commercial restrictions therefore (except the
wise and needful prohibition of immoral and criminal traffic, which no man has
a natural right to engage in) are unjust and oppressive.
10. A tariff for the protection of one particular branch of industry, so far as it
reaches its end, is an unjust tax upon one portion of the community for the
benefit of another ...
Id. at 138 n.2, 142 n.7.
At the Honeoye Liberty Mass Meeting, held December 29, 1846 through January 1,
1847, a declaration of sentiments was unanimously adopted containing similar assertions
and also included the following:
That "the rightful power of all legislation is to declare and enforce our natu-
ral rights and duties, and take none of them from us." That "the idea is quite
unfounded, that, on entering society, we give up any natural right ......
Id. at 142 n.7.
to impose these principles on the states. In the debates on the pro-
posed amendment, ten Congressmen, divided equally between sup-
porters and opponents, voiced substantive comments. No one seri-
ously quarreled with Bingham's definitions of privileges and
immunities, due process, and equal protection. Opponents feared
Congress would utilize these concepts excessively against the states,
something which Bingham vigorously denied would occur since the
Amendment would only authorize Congress to enforce "the Bill of
Rights."
When asked by Representative Hale of New York whether the
amendment was aimed solely at protection of American citizens of
African descent in rebellious states, Bingham denied this, and said it
applied to all the states. It would also safeguard the thousands of
Union supporters in the rebellious states from confiscation and ban-
ishment.87 Subsequent discussion disclosed the extent to which the
amendment would govern the states. The Ohio Representative as-
serted that the amendment conferred upon Congress a general power
to secure for all persons equal protection from the states with respect
to life, liberty, and property. It would enable Congress to strike
down the Oregon constitutional provisions Bingham had condemned
in his 1859 speech. However, Hale's New York did not require Con-
gressional intervention. Bingham was uncertain about its impact in
Indiana. 88
As to real estate, every one knows that its acquisition and transmission
under every interpretation ever given to the word property, as used in the
Constitution of the country, are dependent exclusively upon the local law of
the States, save under a direct grant of the United States. But suppose any
person has acquired property not contrary to the laws of the State, but in
accordance with its law, are they not to be equally protected in the enjoy-
ment of it, or are they to be denied all protection? That is the question, and
the whole question, so far as that part of the case is concerned.8 9
Two exchanges between Hale and Representative Stevens, who
supported the measure, further clarified the intended scope for Con-
gressional authority under the amendment. Hale charged that under
the equal protection provision, Congress would be able to override a
state's civil and criminal legislation, establishing its own laws in-
stead. Stevens replied that the authority was far less broad.
Does the gentleman mean to say that, under this provision, Congress could
interfere in any case where the legislation of a State was equal, impartial to
all? Or is it not simply to provide that, where any State makes a distinction
in the same law between different classes of individuals, Congress shall have
power to correct such discrimination and inequality?9"
87. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065 (1866).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1089.
90. Id. at 1063.
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In response to Hale's assertion that Congress would be empowered
to overrule the states with respect to the property rights of women,
Stevens explained, "[w]hen a distinction is made between two mar-
ried people or two femmes sole, then it is unequal legislation; but
where all of the same class are dealt with in the same way then there
is no pretense of inequality." 91 Stevens' explanations would require
the application of reasonableness distinctions the judiciary later uti-
lized under substantive due process. While their responses and exam-
ples indicated wide coverage for the equal protection provision, both
Bingham and Stevens maintained that state legislation that did not
abridge fundamental liberties would be unaffected.
Coverage under this amendment appears broader than under the
Civil Rights Act, in which protections are enumerated. The statute
would be enforced by the judiciary, while the reach of the amend-
ment would depend on the will of Congress. A state law imposing
restraints on certain persons or groups and not on all others, would
have to be justified to Congress as nondiscriminatory, warranted by
differences in situation or condition. Had the amendment been
adopted, Congress would be in a position to strike down the law liti-
gated in the Lochner case, and for essentially the same reasoning
employed by the Supreme Court. In that decision, the Court was not
persuaded that there was sufficient basis to except bakeries and con-
fectionaries from the prevailing rule of freedom of employment con-
tract. New York had passed a law solely affecting certain persons,
and it did not show adequate reason for this differential treatment.
As we shall see in the following portion of this paper, the final ver-
sion of section 1 was sufficiently similar to the earlier one to allow
for the same outcome under it in a Lochner-type controversy.
The Final Version
On April 28, 1866, the select Joint Committee on Reconstruction
voted 12-3 (only Democrats opposing) to report another proposed
version of the fourteenth amendment, of which section 1 was au-
thored by John Bingham. Section 1 consisted of what is now the
second sentence of the amendment; a prior sentence on citizenship
would be added subsequently. Section 5 did not differ from the one
finally approved. Representative Thaddeus Stevens presented it to
the House on May 8 and Senator Jacob Howard to the Senate on
May 23. Both were members of the Joint Committee. To better
91. Id. at 1064. (See also id. for additional comments of Rep. Hale.)
comprehend the meaning of section 1, I believe it best to discuss the
Senate debate prior to that of the House, and the subsequent com-
mentary will proceed on this basis.
Howard explained the privileges and immunities clause in part by
referring to Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell.
Privileges and immunities "cannot be fully defined in their entire ex-
tent and precise nature," observed the Senator, commenting that
Washington's interpretation does give "some intimation of what
probably will be the opinion of the judiciary." '92 Howard also em-
braced within his definition the "personal rights guarantied [sic] and
secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution." As ex-
amples, he identified many of the rights so safeguarded, omitting
those specifically included in Washington's enumeration. 3 The
clause in question had been drafted to protect "privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States" to whom the Republican lead-
ers thought article IV, section 2 applied, even though not so stated
therein. This resolved the "ellipsis in the language" - the wording
about which Bingham expressed concern in his 1859 speech.9"
In a statement corresponding to what Bingham said in presenting
his earlier version, Howard claimed all of these restraints then bound
the federal government, but not the states.
[T]hese immunities, privileges, rights, thus guarantied [sic] by the Consti-
tution or recognized by it, are secured to the citizen solely as a citizen of
the United States and as a party in their courts. They do not operate in the
slightest degree as a restraint or prohibition upon State legislation..
[Moreover,] there is no power given in the Constitution to enforce and to
carry out any of these guarantees. They are not powers granted by the Con-
stitution to Congress, and of course do not come within the [necessary and
proper] clause of the Constitution... but they stand simply as a bill of
rights in the Constitution, without power on the part of Congress to give
them full effect; while at the same time the States are not restrained from
violating the principles embraced in them except by their own local consti-
tutions, which may be altered from year to year. The great object of the
first section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the
States and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental
guarantees.9 5
Congress would have power under section 5 to enforce these and
other guarantees set forth in the amendment. While not mentioning
it by name, presumably sections 1 and 5, taken together, authorized
the passage of legislation such as the Civil Rights Act. Howard did
not offer separate meanings for the other two clauses, but lumped
them together in a short explanation.
The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State
from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person,
92. Id. at 2765.
93. Id.
94. See supra text accompanying note 73.
95. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866).
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whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
or from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State. This
abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice
of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another. It
prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man is
not to be hanged. It protects the black man in his fundamental rights as a
citizen with the same shield which it thiows over the white man. Is it not
time, Mr. President, that we extend to the black man, I had almost called it
the poor privilege of the equal protection of law? Ought not the time to be
now passed when one measure of justice is to be meted out to a member of
one caste while another and a different measure is meted out to the member
of another caste, both castes being alike citizens of the United States, both
bound to obey the same laws, to sustain the burdens of the same Govern-
ment, and both equally responsible to justice and to God for the deeds done
in the body?96
Accordingly, these clauses outlaw discriminatory racial, class, and
caste legislation. Here Howard speaks of protecting legal equality,
both racial and otherwise, as the Civil Rights Act did. The extent of
this commitment is not defined, but judging from the origins and the
Senator's explanation, it is substantive and substantial. Not being
limited by the specifics contained in the Act, its impact on the states
would be greater. Howard distinguished the privileges and immuni-
ties clause from the others in two respects. First the others applied to
persons rather than just citizens. Second, the privileges and immuni-
ties clause secured fundamental liberties from denial or dimunition
by the states whereas the others forbade unequal application of them
by the states. The Senator's failure to distinguish between the due
process and equal protection clauses suggests that he, like Bingham,
viewed the two as basically alike in their antidiscriminatory
purposes.
The three clauses thus provided sweeping protection for funda-
mental liberties. Except for eliminating direct Congressional involve-
ment, the final version is similar conceptually to Bingham's earlier
one. The privileges and immunities clause ' reads as Bingham inter-
preted his February version of it (and of article IV, section 2). Since
he used equal protection and due process interchangeably, the addi-
tion of due process language and change in equal protection wording
clarified and secured meaning and provided added safeguards. In a
speech to Congress in 1871, Bingham asserted that the final version
was "more comprehensive than as it was first proposed. . . It em-
braces all and more than did the February proposition."9 7
Bingham's speeches reveal that he, like others of his
96. Id. at 2766.
97. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 81, 83-85 (1871).
contemporaries, employed each of the three concepts to condemn op-
pressive state legislation. All were catch-phrases of the antislavery
movements. Absent from the amendment is any reference to civil
rights, attributable probably to the fact the term was thought to in-
clude political rights. As previously explained, the same concern led
to the deletion of this term in the Civil Rights Act.
At the prompting of other Senators, Howard subsequently offered
specific changes to the amendment, which were adopted. One of
these was the addition of the definition of citizenship, which became
the first sentence of section 1. In the ensuing debate, only six Sena-
tors, three from each party, commented substantively on what had
then become the second sentence of section 1. The Republicans ap-
proved, while the Democrats opposed, the latter concentrating their
criticism on the privileges and immunities clause. The sparcity of the
discussion may be attributable in part to the greater passions and
concerns which other sections aroused among the Senators.
Senator Poland of Vermont supported and amplified Howard's ex-
planation. He also maintained the privileges and immunities clause
of the amendment "secures nothing beyond what was intended" in
article IV, section 2. Poland went on to state that many of the states
had repudiated or disregarded this important clause and it was now
eminently proper and necessary that Congress be invested with the
power to enforce it. Furthermore, with slavery abolished, there could
be no valid or reasonable objection to the due process or equal pro-
tection clauses. "[Both clauses are] the very spirit and inspiration of
our system of government, the absolute foundation upon which it
was established. [They are] essentially declared in the Declaration of
Independence and in all the provisions of the Constitution." Because
there was some uncertainty as to the power of Congress to enact the
Civil Rights Act, this amendment would remove all such doubts. 8
Senator Howe of Wisconsin supported section 1 as a means to
combat the wrongs which the rebellious states committed and might
continue to commit. Those states sought to deny "to a large portion
of the population the plainest and most necessary rights of citizen-
ship." These included the right to hold land that had been paid for,
the right to sue for wages that were withheld or other wrongs, and
the right to give testimony. No state should be able to deny its citi-
zens their privileges and immunities or equal protection of the
laws.99 Senator Henderson of Missouri chose to discuss only that
part of section 1 relating to citizenship. The other clauses, he as-
serted, merely secured the rights that attached to citizenship in all
free countries. He implied the amendment would overcome the Black
98. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866).
99. Id. app. 219.
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Codes that had made the Negro a "degraded outcast" deprived of
the "commonest rights" of property and legal processes. 100
Senator Davis saw no need for a new privileges and immunities
clause, for article IV "comprehends the same principle in better and
broader language." He offered no explanation for this conclusion.
Due process should be left to the states where it was already assured
in their constitutions. Equal protection was also a matter for the
states.1"1 Senators Hendricks of Indiana and Johnson of Maryland
spoke about the ambiguity of the privileges clause. The former com-
plained that he had not heard any Senator or statesman accurately
define the rights and immunities of citizenship.102 The latter, a mem-
ber of the Reconstruction Committee, disapproved only this clause,
because he did not understand what its effect would be. 03 His mo-
tion to delete it was rejected. This limited debate may not be very
revealing as to meaning but does have an orientation supportive of
the floor managers' explanations.
When the vote came on June 8 on the joint resolution, it was ap-
proved: yeas-33, nays-11, more than the required two-thirds.
Because of the narrow meaning currently given the term "privi-
leges and immunities" as it appears in article IV, it may appear sur-
prising that only a few Democrats challenged Howard's extensive
definition. However, the debates relating to the fourteenth amend-
ment reveal (as heretofore noted), that probably most of the Repub-
licans regarded privileges and immunities as encompassing all funda-
mental liberties secured in the Constitution, which necessarily would
include those set forth in amendments I through VIII. Antislavery
doctrine advanced this position.0 Were it otherwise, the clause
might secure only a portion of those liberties identified in the eight
amendments, and this would constitute a far lesser commitment to
freedom - and a seemingly incoherent one. Moreover, Justice
Washington had indicated that his list of liberties was not final, and
that unnamed others were also embodied within those specified.
Howard's broad definition, accordingly, remained consistent with
such thinking.
Washington's interpretation differs from the one that has come to
be accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court. Under the existing under-
100. Id. at 3031, 3034-35.
101. Id. at 240.
102. Id. at 3039.
103. Id. at 3041.
104. J. TENBROEK, supra note 53, at 122-31.
standing, the privileges and immunities clause of article IV forbids
any state from discriminating in many matters against citizens of
other states in favor of its own. This clause does not stand as a
guardian for fundamental rights, safeguarding citizens against the
laws of their own or other states, as Washington would have it. Be-
cause Republicans of the Thirty-ninth Congress generally accepted
Washington's meaning, their speeches are sometimes difficult to
comprehend for those steeped in contemporary Supreme Court
doctrine.
Howard's interpretation of privileges and immunities was not un-
common among lawyers of that period. As indicated, it was in keep-
ing with Justice Washington's position. It appears similar to that ex-
pressed by Justice Bradley for himself and Justice Swayne in his
dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases.105 Bradley believed prior to
ratification of the fourteenth amendment, the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States consisted of all the people's liber-
ties including those secured in the Bill of Rights and elsewhere in the
Constitution, even if they were not necessarily safeguarded from lim-
itation by the states. While he did not specifically refer to the Bill of
Rights, Justice Field, in his minority opinion representing the views
of all four dissenters, approved Washington's interpretation: the priv-
ileges and immunities designated by Washington are those "which of
right belong to the citizens of all free governments."1'0 6
Debate in the House on section 1 was likewise not very extensive.
In describing the contents of this section, Representative Stevens
read the privileges and immunities and equal protection clauses but
paraphrased the due process clause as prohibiting the states from
"unlawfully depriving [citizens] of life, liberty, and property." The
provisions of what is now the second sentence of section 1, he main-
tained, were
all asserted in some form or other, in our Declaration or organic law. But
the Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a limitation
on the States. This amendment supplies that defect, and allows Congress to
correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which oper-
ates upon one man shall operate equally upon all.
10 7
Whatever law applies to a white man shall likewise apply to the
black man precisely in the same way and to the same degree. He did
not otherwise define the section, except to assert That it would main-
tain the principles of the Civil Rights Act in the event the latter was
repealed by another Congress. After this short explanation, Stevens
went on to section 2, which he considered the most important one.
Howard and Bingham, as previously described, also viewed the
105. 83 U.S. 36, 111, 116-17 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 97 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
107. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
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Constitution as being defective because it did not permit the Con-
gress or judiciary to apply its fundamental guarantees to the states.
Bingham, among others, claimed the Civil War might have been
averted if the national government could have imposed these re-
straints on the slaveholding states.
Probably the most powerful member of Congress, Stevens was
more radical than Bingham on reconstruction policy. Thus, he
sought to guarantee constitutionally negro suffrage, but could not
obtain enough votes for passage. Bingham did not help him in this
quest. However, both took some consistent positions on amending the
Constitution. Stevens supported Bingham's main efforts: first on the
latter's earlier version of the fourteenth amendment and then on the
Ohioan's addition to section 1 of the draft amendment he authored.
Additionally, he voted to delete this section 1 in favor of the one
drafted by Bingham, which now constitutes the second sentence. The
two had similar ideas in another area which also may be revealing of
their perspective on section 1. During the drafting of the fourteenth
amendment, Stevens sponsored bills that would support the economic
interests of certain railroads against hostile state legislatures. Bing-
ham voted for these measures. Commentators have speculated upon
the effect of such business problems upon the drafting of the amend-
ment.10 8 It is difficult to believe these Congressmen were not aware
the broad language would be invoked in support of commercial
interests.
In a speech near the close of the House debate on the proposed
amendment, Representative Bingham explained that section 1 pro-
tected by national law from abridgement or denial by a state, "the
privileges and immunities of all of the citizens of the Republic and
the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction . . . ."19 In
light of the Congressman's known perspectives, "inborn" most likely
meant natural rights. He used the same term in his 1857 speech
previously mentioned when he condemned states that "trample upon
the inborn rights of humanity" and lauded those which "defend the
inborn rights of each against the combined power of all." 110
In the sentence quoted above from his closing speech, Bingham
summed up the significance and importance of section 1. For him,
privileges and immunities encompassed the fundamental liberties, in-
cluding those contained in the first eight amendments. Both the due
108. H.J. GRAHAM, supra note 53, at 465-66.
109. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
110. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 136 (1857).
process and equal protection clauses further secured these and other
natural rights - for all persons, regardless of citizenship. "That
great want of the citizen and stranger, protection by national jaw
from unconstitutional State enactments, is supplied by the first sec-
tion of this Amendment." '
The balance of the House debate was not very enlightening on
how the representatives construed what is now the second sentence
of section 1. Much of the debate concerned other sections, with a
number of legislators making no reference to section 1. In all, less
than twenty Representatives dealt with section 1. Most of the
Republicans who participated mentioned its relationship to the Civil
Rights Act - that the amendment supplied necessary Congressional
authority to enact it, or constitutionalized its protections against
diminution or extinction by subsequent Congresses.
Some spoke about the personal protections secured by the amend-
ments other than those in the racial area. Representative Thayer
said it "simply brings into the Constitution what is found in the bill
of rights of every State." 1 2 The equality aspects were stressed by
Representatives Raymond"13 and Farnsworth; 114 Representative
Miller said the due process and equal protection clauses were within
the spirit of the Declaration of Independence;" 5 Representative Eck-
ley believed the amendment afforded "[s]ecurity of life, liberty and
property to all citizens of all the states." 116
Of the Democrats, only Representative Rogers of New Jersey (a
member of the Reconstruction Committee) spoke extensively. He
warned that the privileges and immunities clause would revolutionize
the entire constitutional system by eliminating the states' powers.
"[Aill the rights we have under the laws of the country are em-
braced under the definition of privileges and immunities." He as-
serted that the amendment embodied "that outrageous and misera-
ble civil rights bill."' 7
By the time this debate took place, the Congress had been exposed
to civil rights discussions for many months. During this period, they
had been quite discerning in their voting, having substantially al-
tered Trumbull's original bill and postponed Bingham's earlier ver-
sion. Despite their power and prestige, the Republican civil rights
activists could only succeed within certain limits. The legislators ac-
ted on the broad outlines while leaving the details to their commit-
111. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2543 (1866).
112. Id. at 2465.
113. Id. at 2502.
114. Id. at 2539.
115. Id. at 2510.
116. Id. at 2535.
117. Id. at 2538.
[VOL 22: 453. 1985] Rehabilitating Lochner
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
tees and members thereof. This record suggests the Congressmen
had considerable understanding. The fact that certain matters were
not discussed during the debate would seem to reveal no more than
that they were either not of serious concern or noncontroversial.
On May 10, the House by a vote of 128-37 voted to adopt the
joint resolution proposing the fourteenth amendment.
THE DUE PROCESS CONCEPT AND CLAUSE
During the debates on the Civil Rights Bill and the two proposed
Constitutional amendments, the term "privileges and immunities"
was frequently mentioned and defined. Less attention was directed at
the term "due process," which has so much more influenced the
course of the nation's laws. When mentioned, it was always in the
context of limiting governmental authority. As reported, this was the
perspective of Representative Bingham. He equated due process with
equal protection of the laws and fundamental and natural rights. No
representative disputed Bingham's explanation that the equal protec-
tion provision of his first version, which was clearly substantive in
character, did little more than apply the due process clause to the
states. Representative Higby specifically agreed, asserting the lan-
guage of the two guarantees "is very little different."",,
The prior discussion of the Civil Rights Act disclosed Representa-
tive Wilson's convictions as to due process. He believed the Act
merely enforced the protections of the fifth amendment due process
clause against the states. 119 Representative Thayer argued that this
clause gave, by implication at least, sufficient power to Congress to
pass the Civil Rights Act.2 0 For Representative Baker of Illinois,
the proposed due process clause was "a wholesome and needed check
upon the great abuse of liberty which several of the States have
practiced, and which they manifest too much purpose to con-
tinue."' 2' Senator Poland and Representative Miller identified the
due process and equal protection clauses with the spirit of the Decla-
ration of Independence. 122 Representative Williams of New Jersey
118. Id. at 1054.
Bingham was asked by Representative Rogers "what do you mean by 'due process of
law?'" He replied that "the courts have settled that long ago, and the gentleman can go
read their decisions." In view of the definition Bingham had given the concept, it is hard
to consider his answer to the question as a very serious or reasoned one.
119. See supra text accompanying note 18.
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (1866).
121. Id. app. 256.
122. Id. at 2961, 2510.
opined that were suffrage regarded as a property right, its depriva-
tion would violate the due process clause.12 3 Thus, due process of law
meant for these Congressmen a substantive guarantee of life, liberty,
and property. Representative Stevens, as previously reported, ap-
pears to have so construed the clause in introducing the amendment
in the House.
Most Republican Congressmen, particularly those who had been
active or associated with the antislavery movement, held similar
views. Due process was a term often used before, during, and after
the Civil War. Both sides of the slavery controversy employed it to
further their cause. Proslavery forces contended slaves were property
and therefore owners were protected against loss without due pro-
cess. In contrast, beginning in the mid-1830's, antislavery activists
thought of the due process guarantee as "constitutionalizing" their
natural rights beliefs in the sanctity of life, liberty, and property. 124
They repudiated any notion that a person could be someone else's
property; people possessed property in their own selves and the due
process clause obligated the national government to secure it in the
territories.
The due process concept was a major verbal weapon for the aboli-
tionists. Graham observes that due process
was snatched up, bandied about, "corrupted and corroded," if you please,
for more than thirty years prior to 1866. For every black letter usage in
court, there were perhaps hundreds of thousands in the press, red school-
house, and on the stump. Zealots, reformers, and politicians - not jurists
- blazed the paths of substantive due process."' 25
Thus, the political parties committed to eradicating slavery used
the term to advance this position. In 1843 the Liberty Party plat-
form declared that the due process clause of the fifth amendment
legally secured the inalienable rights referred to in the Declaration
of Independence.' 26 The 1848 and 1852 platforms of the Free Soil
Party contended the clause both served as a restraint on the federal
123. Id. at 1063.
124. J. TENBROEK, supra note 53, at 119-22; Kelly, supra note 70, at 1053-55;
H.J. GRAHAM, supra note 53, at 242-65. Concerning the early abolitionist arguments that
would later be advanced under due process and other concepts, see A.L. HIGGINBOTHAM,
JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 329-32 (1978).
125. H.J. GRAHAM, supra note 53, at 250.
"Over the next thirty years [from 1834] due process as a substantive conception be-
came part of the constitutional stock in trade of abolitionism." J. TENBROEK, supra note
53, at 121. "In comparison with the concept of equal protection of the law, the due
process clause was of secondary importance to the abolitionists. It did, however, reach a
full development, and by virtue of its emphasis in the party platforms, a widespread
usage and popular understanding." Id. at 119-20.
126. Id. at 139. The Liberty Party was formed in 1840 and dedicated to antislav-
ery. In 1844, its presidential candidate received 60,000 votes. It continued strong in local
elections in 1846 but united in 1848 with the antislavery Whigs and Democrats to form
the Free Soil Party. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1212 (1963).
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government as well as an obligation that it enforce the inalienable
rights set forth in the Declaration. 127 More significantly, according
to the 1856 and 1860 platforms of the Republican Party, the clause
denied Congress the power to allow slavery to exist in any territory
in the Union. "[I1t becomes our duty to maintain [the due process
provision] by legislation against all attempts to violate it."'1 28 Some
of those involved in the drafting or consideration of the Republican
platforms would probably later, as members of Congress or in other
political roles, be responsible for framing or adopting the fourteenth
amendment. In the 1856 political campaign, "due process of law"
was a leading catch phrase of Republican orators.129
Due process advocacy was not confined to the antislavery move-
ment. At the time the fourteenth amendment was being framed, in-
surance and other corporations submitted large numbers of petitions
to Congress permeated with due process of law reasoning, urging
federal relief from state legislation depriving them of property and
economic freedoms.'30 Commentators have noted the commonality of
interests between corporate and antislavery groups: each thought it
would benefit from the imposition of due process, just compensation,
and privileges and immunities restraints on the states. Both accord-
ingly, lobbied for these positions.' The abolition of slavery elimi-
nated the argument over ownership of the person, and all sides could
thereafter promote personal freedom under the same reasoning.
This layman's general perception of due process was reflected to a
considerable degree in the courts. While the contours of due process
are never precise, it was a definable legal concept in 1866, and to
this extent the Framers of the amendment spoke with clarity, obviat-
ing the need to inquire into their intentions. By then, it was accepted
that due process related to required processes and procedures in civil
law. In this respect, it was a substantive restraint on legislatures,
forbidding them from passing these kinds of oppressive laws. There
was also considerable precedent that due process of law went much
further and protected ownership. In 1857, Chief Justice Taney in-
voked substantive due process as one basis for his decision in the
127. J. TENBROEK, supra note 53, at 140-41 n.n.3 & 4. This party came into exis-
tence in 1847-48 and polled 300,000 votes. Its 1852 candidate for President received over
150,000 votes. It was absorbed into the new Republican Party in 1854. THE COLUMBIA
ENCYCLOPEDIA 767 (1963).
128. J. TENBROEK, supra note 53, at 141 n.n.5 & 6.
129. H.J. GRAHAM, supra note 53, at 80.
130. Id. at 83-88.
131. Id. at 81.
Dred Scott case. Taney held that Congress had no power to prohibit
slavery in specified areas because the "powers over person and prop-
erty ...are not only not granted to Congress, but are in express
terms denied, and they are forbidden to exercise them." 132 Taney
explained this "express" limitation as follows:
And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his
liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property
into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no
offence [sic] against the laws', could hardly be dignified with the name of
due process of law.1 33
On this point, the Chief Justice was supported by the two Justices
who concurred in his opinion. This was not the first time that Taney'
accepted substantive due process. In speaking for the Court in
Bloomer v. McQuewan1 34 in 1852, he had asserted that a special act
depriving licensees of their right to use property protected by patent
"certainly could not be regarded as due process of law." 131 However,
the case was resolved on other grounds.
Substantive due process was a very viable concept among Justices
of the U.S. Supreme Court at the time the fourteenth amendment
was framed and ratified. In a federal circuit court case in 1865,
United States Supreme Court Justice Grier held that a Pennsylvania
statute repealing a railroad corporation charter violated the due
course of law provision of the state constitution.1 36 The first High
Court ruling on due process after framing of the amendment was
Hepburn v. Griswold,1 37 issued February 7, 1870, by a court then
consisting of seven members, all appointed prior to Congress' action.
For the majority of four, Chief Justice Chase held (among other
matters) that holders of contracts for payment in dollars entered into
prior to the effective date of the Legal Tender Act of 1862, were
deprived by that Act of their property in violation of the fifth
amendment due process guarantee. Justice Grier was then no longer
a member of the Court, but had been when the case was decided in
conference on November 27, 1869, at which time he concurred with
the majority. When the contract in Hepburn was executed, the only
form of money that could be lawfully tendered in payment of private
debts was gold or silver coin. To obtain funds for the war effort, the
Act authorized the issuance of paper notes, not redeemable in gold
or silver coin, and provided that with certain exceptions these notes
should "be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts,
132. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857).
133. Id.
134. 55 U.S. 539 (1853).
135. Id. at 553.
136. Baltimore v. Pittsburgh & C.R.R., 2 F. Cas. 570 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1865) (No.
827).
137. 75 U.S. 603 (1870).
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public and private, within the United States." While the litigation
was pending, the value of dollars in coin exceeded that in notes.
The majority concluded the due process clause protects holders of
contracts to the same extent that it does owners of real property.
According to Chase, the clause (as well as other provisions of the
fifth amendment) operates "directly in limitation and restraint of the
legislative powers conferred by the Constitution."138 Justice Miller,
for the minority of three, did not deny that the clause was a substan-
tive limitation on the legislature. He objected that the effect on hold-
ers was incidental to the purpose of the Congress to further the war
effort. President Grant subsequently appointed two Justices who, on
May 1, 1871 in Knox v. Lee 39 joined with the three dissenters to
reverse Hepburn. Writing for the majority in Knox, Justice Strong
applied the same analysis to the due process issue as Miller had, and
Chase followed his prior interpretation.
One of the dissenting Justices in Hepburn was Swayne, and he
and newly appointed Justice Bradley voted with the majority in
Knox. Neither should be considered antagonistic to substantive due
process. On the contrary, both contended in their dissents in the
Slaughter-House Cases, decided the following year (and to be dis-
cussed subsequently), that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment secured property and economic interests. On the issue of
protecting vested property interests, these Justices would have
agreed with the four who made up the majority in Hepburn. In
Knox, Bradley filed a concurring opinion, arguing that Congress had
full power to enact the disputed legislation. He did not discuss due
process directly. Presumably, Swayne, who did not file a separate
opinion in either case, agreed.
Decided in 1872, the Slaughter-House Cases were the next major
decision involving due process. In 1869, the Louisiana legislature
granted a 25-year exclusive privilege to a private corporation it had
created to operate a regulated livestock and slaughterhouse business
within a specified area of about 1150 square miles, comprising New
Orleans and two other parishes. The privilege required that all cattle
brought into this area for commercial purposes be slaughtered by the
corporation or at its facilities. By a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the monopoly as not in violation of the fourteenth
amendment or any other section of the Constitution. The opinion
centered on the privileges and immunities clause. With respect to the
138. Id. at 624.
139. 79 U.S. 457 (1871).
due process clause, Miller said for the majority that "under no con-
struction of that provision that we have ever seen" can the restraint
imposed on the butchers be held to be a deprivation of property
within the meaning of that provision.140
The four dissenters protested that the objective of the fourteenth
amendment was to give the Court precisely the power to strike down
measures such as the Louisiana statute which encroached upon the
ability of citizens to acquire property and pursue business. In his
dissent for the four-person minority, Field relied on the meaning of
the privileges and immunities clause and did not discuss due pro-
cess. 41 However, Justice Bradley, in his separate dissenting opinion
concurred in by Justice Swayne, did comment on it, stating that "a
law which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a lawful
employment, or from following a lawful employment previously
adopted, does deprive them of liberty as well as property, without
due process of law. '14 2
It is possible that Field and the other dissenter, Chief Justice
Chase, would have found the due process clause violated had this
been the critical issue in the case. Field, who agreed with Chase's
opinions in Hepburn and Knox, became in time the Court's strongest
champion of substantive due process.1 43 A leading abolitionist,
Chase, long prior to his appointment to the Court, had advanced the
due process concept to support antislavery theory and goals.14' Jus-
tice Clifford concurred in Miller's opinion in the Slaughter-House
Cases but he also agreed with Chase in the two legal tender cases.
Nor should Justice Miller's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases
label him as an opponent of substantive due process. A literal read-
ing of Miller's language suggests no more than that due process did
not encompass the activities in question. It did not mean that vested
property rights were outside its scope. That Miller was inclined to
include such rights is revealed by his decision in a case that was
submitted in briefs at the time that the Slaughter-House Cases were
argued, but remained undecided until the following year. 14 In this
case, Iowa's state-wide prohibition law, which had been enacted in
1851, came under attack as a violation of due process. Miller wrote
that a statute prohibiting the sale of property would raise "very
0
140. 83 U.S. at 80. "To reach the conclusion of Justice Miller and the majority,
one must disregard not only all antislavery and all anti-race discrimination theory from
1834 on, but one must ignore virtually every word said in the debates of 1865-66." H.J.
GRAHAM, supra note 53, at 319.
141. 83 U.S. at 83.
142. 83 U.S. at 122.
143. B. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 53-54.
144. J. TENBROEK, supra note 53, at 61-63; H.J. GRAHAM, supra note 53, at 255,
301 n.18.
145. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129 (1873).
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grave questions" under the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. However, Miller decided that the case did not present this
issue.
It is not difficult to conclude that during the period when the
amendment was framed and ratified and for some time thereafter, a
majority of the Supreme Court would have held that due process
protected substantively the ownership of property.
At the state level, due process clauses were also applied to strike
down legislative interferences with ownership. A leading pre-Civil
War decision on due process at the state level is Wynehamer v. Peo-
ple, 4" an 1856 New York case in which a state penal statute forbid-
ding the sale of intoxicating liquors owned at the time of enactment
(except for medicinal and religious purposes) and requiring the de-
struction of such as were intended for sale, was declared to violate
the due process clause of the state constitution. New York's highest
court held that the clause protected the prerogatives of ownership;
that is, said one of the Justices, while some regulation is possible,
"where [property] rights are acquired by the citizen under the ex-
isting law, there is no power in any branch of the government to take
them away."' 41
The most influential'commentator in the period following the rati-
fication of the amendment, Thomas M. Cooley, also asserted that
due process secured property rights. In the first edition of his famous
book on constitutional limitations, published in 1868,148 he concluded
that government can violate due process by the limitations it imposes
and not any considerations of mere form. . . . When the government,
through its established agencies, interferes with the title to one's property,
or with his independent enjoyment of it, and its act is called in question as
not in accordance with the law of the land, we are to test its validity by
those principles of civil liberty and constitutional defence [sic] which have
become established in our system of law, and not by any rules that pertain
to forms of procedure merely .... Due process of law in each particular
case means, such an exertion of the powers of government as the settled
maxims of law sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of
individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which
the one in question belongs."
146. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). This decision was not followed in other states, probably
for the most part due to the sensitivity of the liquor issue. For a survey of pre-fourteenth
amendment cases involving due process or law of the land provisions, see B. SIEGAN,
supra note 1, at 24-46; R.L. MorT, supra note 68, at 256-77, 275-99.
147. 13 N.Y. at 393.
148. T.M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (Repub.
ed. 1972) (Ist ed. Boston 1868).
149. Id. at 356.
Cooley concedes that private rights to property may be interfered
with by any branch of government.
The chief restriction is that vested rights must not be disturbed; but in its
application as a shield of protection, the term "vested rights" is not used in
any narrow or technical sense, as importing a power of legal control merely,
but rather as implying a vested interest which it is equitable the govern-
ment should recognize, and of which the individual cannot be deprived
without injustice.150
The Justice goes on to discuss those property interests protected
by due process (or its equivalent, law of the land) clauses. Thus,
according to this authoritative commentator, due process at the time
the fourteenth amendment came into being provided substantive
safeguards for property interests; he rejected the view that it had no
more than procedural significance in civil matters.
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND Lochner
United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field explained in
1872 that section 1 of the fourteenth amendment was intended to
give practical effect to the "declaration of 1776 of inalienable
rights." Writing for himself and the other three dissenters in the
Slaughter-House Cases, he asserted that it "secures the like protec-
tion to all citizens ...against any abridgement of their common
rights [by the States]."'151 The foregoing study of section 1 supports
this conclusion. This section was drafted to accord substantial pro-
tection for liberty at the state level. Each clause of its second sen-
tence was directed toward this end, and, collectively, they constitute
a formidable barrier against state excesses and oppressions.
Although this general commitment is quite plain, it does not re-
veal what activity is safeguarded and to what extent. This inquiry
may not be readily resolved for many areas but it can be satisfied for
the liberties about which this article is concerned, those relating to
property and economics. In the civil area these were liberties of high-
est concern to those responsible for the framing of section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment, as is evident from the views expressed by
them as well as the law and commentaries that are most important
to understanding it. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Justice Washing-
ton's definition of privileges and immunities, and the commentaries
of Blackstone and Kent (the most quoted and respected legal author-
ities), all emphasize the importance of property ownership in a free
society, and the liberties required to make it meaningful, such as the
right of contract. There should be little doubt that people supportive
of the doctrines expounded or advanced in the said materials would
strive to secure the economic freedoms in the fourteenth amendment.
150. Id. at 357-58.
151. 83 U.S. at 105.
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This background can be summarized briefly as follows: I
1. Section 1 of the amendment established the principles of the
Civil Rights Act in the Constitution so that they could not be re-
pealed by a subsequent Congress. The Act protected against discrim-
inatory treatment the rights of most United States citizens "to make
and enforce contracts ... [and] to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold
and convey real and personal property."
2. According to Justice Washington, the privileges and immunities
belonging to citizens of all free governments include "the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of
every kind," and with respect to citizens of one state the "right...
to pass through, or to reside in, any other state for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, [and] to take, hold and dispose of
property, either real or personal." Washington did not specifically
refer to it, but the freedom of contract would be comprehended
under the property rights he did mention. Contracts are a form of
property in that they are an asset or acquisition (Blackstone's term)
that can be purchased, held, and sold. They are requisite likewise for
the acquisition, use, and transfer of private property.' 52 Both Senator
Trumbull and Representative Wilson explained that all of the rights
set forth in the Civil Rights Act were included in Washington's
definition.
3. The debates disclose that Sir William Blackstone and Chancel-
lor James Kent were highly authoritative for the Congress on the
powers and purposes of government. The former declared that "the
principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of
those [three] absolute rights," which were to personal security, per-
sonal liberty, and private property. For Blackstone, the right of prop-
erty meant the "free use, enjoyment, and disposal [by the owner] of
all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by
the laws of the land." The legislature could acquire property but
only by giving the owner "full indemmification and equivalent for
the injury thereby sustained.' 1 53 Kent wrote that the right to acquire
and enjoy property is "natural, inherent, and unalienable.' ' 54
152. There should be little doubt that Bingham and his colleagues would have ac-
cepted John Marshall's position that the right of contract was a natural right. Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 346-47 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
153. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 85, at *120, 134-35.
154. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1 (Repub. ed. 1971) (1st ed.
New York 1827).
There have been modern theorists, who have considered . . . [the] inequalities
of property, as the cause of injustice, and the unhappy result of government and
The legitimacy of the Lochner review should be considered in light
of this background. Because it incorporates the principles of the Act,
resolution of this issue should not differ under section 1 of the four-
teenth amendment from what it would be under the statute. Lochner
involved the question whether the state, under the circumstances in-
volved, could regulate the terms of certain employment contracts.
The Civil Rights Act secured the "right . . . to make and enforce
contracts," which would therefore comprehend the Lochner situa-
tion. Moreover, the Thirty-ninth Congress drafted the Act to protect,
among other things, the right of emancipated Blacks to contract
freely for the purchase and sale of goods and services. The legislators
sought to eliminate state laws that regulated the terms of employ-
ment for the Blacks because these laws discriminated against them,
Clearly the statute comprehended employment contracts.
The defendant in Lochner was an employer who complained that
the New York statute deprived him and other bakery employers of
the right to contract with employees for more than ten hours of work
per day, or a total of sixty per week. Were the statute confined to
black employers, there is little question it would invite inquiry under
the Act. The state would have the burden to justify different treat-
ment for the black employers. Being a legal equality statute, the
state would have the same obligation under it were a group of white
citizens similarly restricted.
Such an interpretation would correspond with both the political
and economic perspectives dominant in the Thirty-ninth Congress.
Pursuant to the explanations given by Bingham and Stevens, a simi-
lar burden would be borne by the state under the original version of
section 1 that was presented to Congress in February. 155 Because the
final version provides no less protection against the states, it would
likewise safeguard the bakery employers.
The constitutional outcome should not differ even if it is assumed
that the Civil Rights Act was confined solely to racial discrimina-
tion, as some contend it was. The liberties enumerated in the statute
were of most concern to the Thirty-ninth Congress or they would not
artificial institutions. But human society would be in a most unnatural and mis-
erable condition, if it were instituted or reorganized on the basis of such specu-
lations. The sense of property is graciously implanted in the human breast, for
the purpose of rousing us from sloth, and stimulating us to action; and so long as
the right of acquisition is exercised in conformity to the social relations, and the
moral obligations which spring from them, it ought to be sacredly protected.
The natural and active sense of property pervades the foundations of social im-
provement. It leads to the cultivation of the earth, the institution of government,
the acquisition of the comforts of life, the growth of the useful arts, the spirit of
commerce, the productions of taste, the erections of charity, and the display of
the benevolent affections.
Id. at 256-57.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
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have been named in both the Act and the Freedmen's Bureau Bill. It
would be most unlikely that Congress would have secured them
under the statutes but not under the Constitution. It would be very
odd indeed if the Congress did not intend to safeguard liberty of
contract under section 1.
Lochner was an interpretation of the due process clause. The
charge that Lochner was a lawless construction of that clause is in
part grounded on the supposition that due process in the 1860's re-
lated only to procedure and not to substance. However, there is no
indication in the relevant debates that Bingham and his fellow
Republicans so confined it. Among other things, they equated due
process with equal application of the laws. The equal protection pro-
vision of Bingham's initial version of section 1 was premised on this
understanding. For them, due process meant essentially protection
against government oppression, which could take many forms.
The courts did not then accord this interpretation to the due pro-
cess guarantee. During the period in question, most U.S. Supreme
Court justices regarded due process as a safeguard for vested prop-
erty or other material interests but did not extend this protection
further into the economic area to include liberty of contract. In time,
and for good reason, the Court eliminated this distinction.
The paramount idea of due process, that government cannot de-
prive people of their fundamental rights, has been a part of Anglo-
Saxon law since King John accepted the Magna Charta in 1215.
Chapter 39 provides essentially that no freeman shall be arrested, or
detained in prison, or deprived of his freehold, or outlawed, or ban-
ished, or in any way molested unless by the lawful judgment of his
peers and by the law of the land. Due process of law became in time
synonomous with law of the land. Thus state constitutions usually
contained either law of the land or due process clauses. Over the
years, English and American courts have expanded the meaning of
due process to embody contemporary concerns for the preservation
of liberty, at times going no further than protecting process and
procedures.
Understandably, due process did not remain limited to securing
vested interests. Deciding the issue on a case-to-case basis, as is typi-
cal of American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court enlarged the pro-
tections of the due process clauses to include, by 1897, the liberty to
contract for the production, distribution, and sale of goods and
services. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana,156 Justice Peckham explained the
unanimous ruling:
The liberty mentioned in [the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment] means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere
physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed
to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where
he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood
or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion
the purposes above mentioned. 157
Due process does not bar all governmental restraints in the area it
impacts; it forbids unjustified restraints. This is consistent with long
held English-American conceptions about the limits of governmental
powers. Thus, Blackstone defined civil liberty as "no other than nat-
ural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is
necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public." 1 8
So too, Justice Washington asserted that the fundamental liberties
he designated belonged of right to citizens of all free governments,
but were "[s]ubject nevertheless to such restraints as the government
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole." 119 Congress-
man Bingham accepted this idea with the likely exception that a
very high burden of proof be borne by the government in justifying a
restraint.
CONCLUSION
While it involved only the due process provision, the inquiry con-
ducted by the United States Supreme Court in Lochner was consis-
tent with the Framers' understanding of each of the three clauses in
the second sentence of section 1. Because both "privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States" and "equal protection of
the laws" were provisions not previously construed by the courts, the
Framers' meaning of them should be controlling.
There is greater difficulty in interpreting the due process clause
inasmuch as it had judicial meaning when the amendment was
framed. By the date of Lochner, however, the definition which in the
1860's went substantively no further than to include vested property
rights, had, in the normal course of adjudication, comprehended con-
tracts of employment. This development is not antagonistic to the
basic rationale of due process nor an unrealistic extension in mean-
ing. Constitutional adjudication does not preclude sensible movement
156. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
157. Id. at 589.
158. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 85, at *121.
159. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). See
also supra text accompanying note 11.
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in interpretation. Thus, when Lochner was decided, the constitu-
tional outcome should have been the same, whether the interpreta-
tion relied on the judicial or the Framers' meaning of due process.

